The following article was written by our law firm on 8 March 2008, prior to the Spanish parliamentary elections held that year. In light of the upcoming elections on 26 June 2016, we have decided to republish it on our website, as it describes the Spanish electoral law that is still in force despite all the political changes that have taken place.

Fifteen years had to pass before another televised debate between the presidential candidates of the two major political parties could be held in Spain. Until two weeks ago, the last time José María Aznar and Felipe Gonzalez had faced each other was in 1993, when they competed for the voters’ favour in a media-friendly manner. Expectations were therefore all the greater when not one but two debates were announced, scheduled for 25 February and 3 March, between Mariano Rajoy (PP) and José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero (PSOE). As predicted by numerous experts, both live broadcasts achieved record-breaking viewing figures. Curiously, and despite the fact that the announcement of these events had been widely welcomed in advance, three parties (Izquierda Unida, IU = United Left; Convergència i Unió, CiU = Convergence and Union; and Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV = Basque Nationalist Party) attempted to prevent the debate from taking place before the Supreme Court of Spain ruled that it must go ahead. CiU = Convergence and Union and Partido Nacionlista Vasco, PNV = Basque Nationalist Party) attempted to have the debate banned by the Spanish Supreme Court – Senate for Administrative Matters (Tribunal Supremo – Sección Contencioso-Administrativa).

The applicants argued that the debate and the ubiquitous advertising for it would lead to an unequal distribution of voter attention. This would give Spain’s two largest parties and their leading candidates a platform that would be unfairly denied to other contenders.

As expected, the urgent motion was unanimously rejected by the three senators, but it reveals that the elections scheduled for 9 March are not just about whether the next Spanish president will be Zapatero or Rajoy – even if that seems to be the only thing that interests the international press.

Given the ongoing neck-and-neck race between the two candidates, the question is rather which parties could support a majority capable of forming a government.

The structure of the Spanish electoral system has a number of special features that can result in smaller parties winning a disproportionate number of seats in the Spanish parliament, depending on the geographical distribution of their voters and thus ultimately regardless of the total number of votes they receive.

The Spanish electoral system

Article 68.1 of the Spanish Constitution stipulates that the Spanish Parliament shall consist of between 300 and 400 members. However, the specific number of seats is determined by the Spanish General Election Act (Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del Régimen Electoral General, or LOREG for short), which implements the framework provisions of the Constitution. According to this Act, the number of seats is set at 350. This number can be reduced to 250 in the event of a general election. Arial, sans-serif;”>), which implements the framework provisions of the Constitution. According to this, the number of seats is set at 350. This number can in turn be traced back to the referendum held in 1976, in which – one year after the death of the dictator Franco – the Spanish people were asked to vote on the future political system of Spain. The two-chamber system put to the vote, consisting of a House of Representatives and a Senate, provided for the former to be composed of 350 representatives. Each representative was to represent 100,000 inhabitants.

However, the question of how to organise the constituencies from which these 350 members were to be elected was and remains problematic.

Due to the strong historical significance and identity of individual territories on the one hand, and the sometimes very different population densities on the other, a constituency model was developed that was intended to ensure comprehensive but at the same time proportional parliamentary representation.

Each of the 50 Spanish provinces is therefore allocated two minimum seats in accordance with Article 162 LOREG (the two autonomous cities of Melilla and Ceuta in North Africa each receive one ’basic seat”). This ensures minimum representation for all 52 territories.

Of the original 350 seats, 248 remain, which are distributed according to the Hare-Niemeyer method described in Article 162.3 LOREG, depending on the respective population of the individual provinces or autonomous cities.

How are the vacant seats distributed among the constituencies?

To determine the total number of seats in each constituency, the population of Spain must first be divided by the number of remaining seats (248).

This determines the so-called ‘distribution quota’.

Each constituency then receives as many seats as are determined by dividing the population of the constituency by the ‘distribution quota’. However, only whole numbers are used for the result.

Since the use of whole numbers leaves some seats remaining, these are distributed among the constituencies in such a way that those which, according to the calculation described above, have the highest decimal places, i.e. the highest decimal places (as explained, only whole numbers are used in the calculation), receive one of the remaining seats.

Here is an example:

According to the latest projections for 2007, Spain has 45,200,737 inhabitants.

If we divide this number by 248, we get a ‘distribution rate’ of 182,261.03.

In the case of Murcia, the population would then be (1,392,117) would then be divided by the distribution ratio (182,261.03).

The result would be: 7.63

This means that Murcia is entitled to seven additional seats in addition to the two initial seats (only whole numbers are used).

Murcia would then have a total of 9 seats.

Since some of the 248 seats remain after applying this distribution system, they are distributed as described among the constituencies that achieved the highest decimal places.

Murcia belongs to this group due to its result of 7. Arial, sans-serif;”>63 to this group and therefore receives an additional seat.

As a result, the next Spanish Parliament will include 10 members from Murcia.

For the upcoming elections, the total distribution of seats by constituency is as follows:

Álava 4 · Albacete 4 · Alicante 12

Almería 6 · Asturias 8 · Ávila 3

Badajoz 6 · Balearic Islands 8 · Barcelona 31

Burgos 4 · Cáceres 4 · Cádiz 9

Cantabria 5 · Castellón 5 · Ceuta 1

Ciudad Real 5 · Córdoba 6 · Coruña 8

Cuenca 3 · Girona 6 · Granada 7

Guadalajara 3 · Guipúzcoa 6 · Huelva 5

Huesca 3 · Jaén 6 · León 5

Lleida 4 · Lugo 4 · Madrid 35

Málaga 10 · Melilla 1 · Murcia 10

Navarra 5 · Ourense 4 · Palencia 3

Palmas (Las) 8 · Pontevedra 7 · Rioja (La) 4

Salamanca 4 · Tenerife 7 · Segovia 3

Seville 12 · Soria 2 · Tarragona 6

Teruel 3 · Toledo 6 · Valencia 16

Valladolid 5 · Vizcaya 8 · Zamora 3

Zaragoza 7

How are the seats in a constituency distributed among the candidates?

Within a constituency, seats are distributed among the parties in accordance with Article 163 LORED, following a rule developed by the Dutch mathematician D’Hondt:

All nominations that receive less than 3% of the votes are disregarded. This could therefore be referred to as a ‘3% threshold’.

The remaining candidates are then ranked in a table according to the number of votes they received (in descending order).

The votes received are then divided by 1, 2, 3, etc. (according to the number of seats to be allocated in the constituency) and entered in the table.

The seats are distributed among the highest values.

Here is an example:

480,000 valid votes were cast in a constituency.

There are 8 seats to be allocated in this constituency.

Six candidates exceed the 3% threshold.

We assume the most successful nominations and distribute the seats one after the other in descending order.

In the table above, election proposal A receives the first seat with 168,000 votes.

The second highest value after 168,000 in the table is 104,000. This belongs to election proposal B. B receives the second seat.

The third highest value after 168,000 and 104,000 is 84,000. This belongs to election proposal A. A receives the third seat.

Applying this rule to each of the eight seats available gives the following result:

Election proposal A = 4 seats

Election proposal B = 2 seats

Election proposal C = 1 seat

Election proposal D = 1 seat

Election proposal E = 0 seats

Election proposal F = 0 seats

Consequences or effects of this electoral system

a.) Small constituencies with few seats lead to a much higher barrier to entry in reality than the 3% threshold.

Where, for example, only three seats are allocated, even a party with a relatively high share of the vote cannot field a single representative if the major parties are successful.

b.) Constituencies with small populations have an unequal population/seat ratio compared to the most populous provinces due to the two basic seats allocated to all provinces (one seat in the autonomous cities).

Madrid has 35 seats in this election, which are distributed among 6,081,689 inhabitants. This means that 173,762 inhabitants are represented by one seat.

In Guipúzcoa (province within the Basque Country), on the other hand, there are 7 seats for 694,944 inhabitants. This means that there are only 99,277 inhabitants per seat.

This gives regional parties that are popular within a small territory a clear advantage in the House of Representatives.

c.) Small parties that run throughout Spain but do not have a concentrated geographical voter base receive only a few seats in proportion to the votes they receive in Spain as a whole.

The best example of this is the left-wing party Izquierda Unida (‘IU’).

Although it received almost 1,300,000 votes across Spain in the 2000 parliamentary elections, it ultimately won only 8 seats.

In contrast, the Catalan party Convergència i Unió won 15 seats in the same elections with just under 965,000 votes.

d.) If you look at the neck-and-neck race between Mariano Rajoy and José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and bear in mind that in virtually all the polls available, the votes of those surveyed were weighted equally (i.e. one person = one vote), it quickly becomes clear how significant a factor the proportional representation system described above can be in determining the outcome of the election in favour of one candidate or the other.

A small percentage lead therefore does not necessarily mean that the election is decided.

It depends much more on where these votes come from.

Overall, therefore, it can only be said that nothing can be said about the outcome of the election at this stage, and that the success of the small parties – especially the regional parties – will have a significant influence on who emerges victorious from the presidential elections in a few days’ time.